

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA  
WESTERN DIVISION**

TIMOTHY ARMSTRONG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AMERICAN PALLET LEASING INC.,  
et al.,

Defendants.

No. C07-4107-MWB

**ORDER REGARDING  
MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND  
RECOMMENDATION  
CONCERNING PLAINTIFFS’  
MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT  
JUDGMENT**

***I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND***

On November 30, 2007, plaintiffs, all investors in the corporation American Pallet Leasing, Inc. (“APL”) filed their complaint in this case against a large number of defendants, including defendants John Brda, Christopher Curnutt, Bradley Doss, Suzanne Wonderly, Bryron Hudson, Keith Kerbaugh, and Robert Vinson (“the Defaulting Defendants”).<sup>1</sup> On October 10, 2008, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint.<sup>2</sup> In their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs set out the following fourteen causes of action against the named defendants: (1) violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act § 1962(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count 1); (2) violation of RICO § 1962(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (Count 2); (3) violation of RICO § 1962(d), 18 U.S.C.

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<sup>1</sup>The complaint named 177 plaintiffs and 76 defendants.

<sup>2</sup>The First Amended Complaint reduced the number of named defendants to 43.

§ 1962(d) (Count 3); (4) breach of fiduciary duty (Count 4); (5) conversion (Count 5); (6) negligent misrepresentations/nondisclosures (Count 6); (7) fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions (Count 7); (8) violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10(b-5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Count 8); (9) violation of § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (Count 9); (10) violation of § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (Count 10); (11) violation of § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (Count 11); (12) controlling persons under § 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (Count 12); (13) professional negligence (Count 13); and, (14) punitive damages (Count 14).

On April 23, 2012, plaintiffs filed Motions For Default Judgment (docket nos. 591 and 592) against the Defaulting Defendants. None of the Defaulting Defendants resisted plaintiffs’ motions. On May 22, 2012, former Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss granted plaintiffs’ motions and entered judgment against defendant John Brda in the amount of \$900,000.00, against defendant Christopher Curnutt in the amount of \$900,000.00, against defendants Bradley Doss and Suzanne Wonderly, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$272,730.00, and against defendants Byron Hudson, Keith Kerbaugh, and Robert Vinson, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$4,358,671.57. On May 23, 2012, Judge Zoss ordered that his prior Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motions For Default Judgment be deemed a report and recommendation. Judge Zoss also ordered the case stayed until June 11, 2012. Neither the plaintiffs nor any of the Defaulting Defendants have filed objections to Judge Zoss’s Report and Recommendation. I, therefore, undertake the necessary review of Judge Zoss’s recommended disposition of plaintiffs’ Motions For Default Judgment.

## ***II. LEGAL ANALYSIS***

### ***A. Standard Of Review***

I review the magistrate judge's report and recommendation pursuant to the statutory standards found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1):

A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) (stating identical requirements); N.D. IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a magistrate judge but not articulating any standards to review the magistrate judge's report and recommendation). While examining these statutory standards, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue *de novo* if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, *sua sponte* or at the request of a party, under a *de novo* or any other standard.

*Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). Thus, a district court *may* review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. *Id.* If a party files an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, the district court *must* "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required "to give any

more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate.” *Thomas*, 474 U.S. at 150.

De novo review, of course, is nondeferential and generally allows a reviewing court to make an “independent review” of the entire matter. *Salve Regina College v. Russell*, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (noting also that “[w]hen *de novo* review is compelled, no form of appellate deference is acceptable”); see *Doe v. Chao*, 540 U.S. 614, 620-19 (2004) (noting de novo review is “distinct from any form of deferential review”). The de novo review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, only means a district court “‘give[s] fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made.’” *United States v. Raddatz*, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, at 3, *reprinted in* 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6163 (discussing how certain amendments affect 28 U.S.C. § 636(b))). Thus, while de novo review generally entails review of an entire matter, in the context of § 636 a district court's *required* de novo review is limited to “de novo determination[s]” of only “those portions” or “specified proposed findings” to which objections have been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see *Thomas*, 474 U.S. at 154 (“Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any *issue* need only ask.” (emphasis added)). Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated de novo review would only be required if objections were “specific enough to trigger *de novo* review.” *Branch v. Martin*, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989). Despite this “specificity” requirement to trigger de novo review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “emphasized the necessity . . . of retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate.” *Belk v. Purkett*, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, the Eighth Circuit has been willing to “liberally construe[]” otherwise general pro se objections to require a de novo review of all “alleged errors,” see *Hudson v. Gammon*, 46 F.3d 785,

786 (8th Cir. 1995), and to conclude that general objections require “full *de novo* review” if the record is concise, *Belk*, 15 F.3d at 815 (“Therefore, even had petitioner’s objections lacked specificity, a *de novo* review would still have been appropriate given such a concise record.”). Even if the reviewing court must construe objections liberally to require *de novo* review, it is clear to me that there is a distinction between making an objection and making no objection at all. *See Coop. Fin. Assoc., Inc. v. Garst*, 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (“The court finds that the distinction between a flawed effort to bring objections to the district court’s attention and no effort to make such objections is appropriate.”). Therefore, I strive to provide *de novo* review of all issues that might be addressed by any objection, whether general or specific, but do not feel compelled to give *de novo* review to matters to which no objection at all has been made.

In the absence of any objection, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated a district court should review a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation under a clearly erroneous standard of review. *See Grinder v. Gammon*, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting when no objections are filed and the time for filing objections has expired, “[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”); *Taylor v. Farrier*, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting the advisory committee’s note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) indicates “when no timely objection is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record”); *Branch*, 886 F.2d at 1046 (contrasting *de novo* review with “clearly erroneous standard” of review, and recognizing *de novo* review was required because objections were filed). I am unaware of any case that has described the clearly erroneous standard of review in the context of a district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which no objection has been filed. In other contexts, however, the Supreme Court has stated the “foremost” principle under this standard of review “is that

‘[a] finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” *Anderson v. City of Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting *United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Thus, the clearly erroneous standard of review is deferential, *see Dixon v. Crete Medical Clinic, P.C.*, 498 F.3d 837, 847 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting a finding is not clearly erroneous even if another view is supported by the evidence), but a district court may still reject the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation when the district court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” *U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 333 U.S. at 395.

Even though some “lesser review” than de novo is not “positively require[d]” by statute, *Thomas*, 474 U.S. at 150, Eighth Circuit precedent leads me to believe that a clearly erroneous standard of review should generally be used as the baseline standard to review all findings in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that are not objected to or when the parties fail to file any timely objections, *see Grinder*, 73 F.3d at 795; *Taylor*, 910 F.2d at 520; *Branch*, 886 F.2d at 1046; *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”). In the context of the review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, I believe one further caveat is necessary: a district court always remains free to render its own decision under de novo review, regardless of whether it feels a mistake has been committed. *See Thomas*, 474 U.S. at 153-54. Thus, while a clearly

erroneous standard of review is deferential and the minimum standard appropriate in this context, it is not mandatory, and I may choose to apply a less deferential standard.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the context of a dispositive matter originally referred to a magistrate judge, does not review a district court's decision in similar fashion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals will either apply a clearly erroneous or plain error standard to review factual findings, depending on whether the appellant originally objected to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See United States v. Brooks*, 285 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Ordinarily, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error . . . . Here, however, the record reflects that [the appellant] did not object to the magistrate's report and recommendation, and therefore we review the court's factual determinations for plain error." (citations omitted)); *United States v. Looking*, 156 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[W]here the defendant fails to file timely objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the factual conclusions underlying that defendant's appeal are reviewed for plain error."). The plain error standard of review is different than a clearly erroneous standard of review, *see United States v. Barth*, 424 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining the four elements of plain error review), and ultimately the plain error standard appears to be discretionary, as the failure to file objections technically waives the appellant's right to appeal factual findings, *see Griffini v. Mitchell*, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating an appellant who did not object to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation waives his or her right to appeal factual findings, but then choosing to "review[] the magistrate judge's findings of fact for plain error"). An appellant does not waive his or her right to appeal questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact by failing to object to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *United States v. Benshop*, 138 F.3d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The rule in this circuit is that a failure to object to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation will *not* result in a waiver of the right to appeal 'when the questions involved are questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact.'") (quoting *Francis v. Bowen*, 804 F.2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1986), in turn quoting *Nash v. Black*, 781 F.2d 665, 667 (8th Cir. 1986))). In addition, legal conclusions will be reviewed de novo, regardless of whether an appellant objected to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell*, 498 F.3d 799, 801 n.2 (8th Cir. 2007) ("In cases like this one, 'where the defendant fails to file timely objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the factual conclusions underlying that defendant's appeal are reviewed for plain error.' We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo." (citation (continued...))

As noted above, no objections have been filed. As a result, I have reviewed the magistrate judge's report and recommendation under a clearly erroneous standard of review. *See Grinder v. Gammon*, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting when no objections are filed and the time for filing objections has expired, "[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error"); *Taylor v. Farrier*, 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting the advisory committee's note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) indicates "when no timely objection is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record"). After conducting my review, I am not "left with [a] definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," and find no reason to reject or modify the magistrate judge's recommendation. *Anderson v. City of Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting *United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Therefore, I **accept** Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation, and **grant** plaintiffs' Motions For Default Judgment. Judgment is entered as follows: against defendant John Brda in the amount of \$900,000.00; against defendant Christopher Curnutt in the amount of \$900,000.00; against defendants Bradley Doss and Suzanne Wonderly, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$272,730.00; and, against defendants Byron Hudson, Keith Kerbaugh, and Robert Vinson, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$4,358,671.57. Interest on each of these judgments shall accrue from and after the date of the entry of the judgment at the federal judgment rate.


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<sup>3</sup>(...continued)  
omitted)).



**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

**DATED** this 7th day of September, 2012.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark W. Bennett". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line extending from the end of the name.

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MARK W. BENNETT  
U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA